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Actions that are chosen have properties that distinguish them from actions that are not. Of
the nearly infinite possible actions that can achieve any given task, many of the unchosen
actions are irrelevant, incorrect, or inappropriate. Others are relevant, correct, or appropri-
ate but are disfavored for other reasons. Our research focuses on the question of what
distinguishes actions that are chosen from actions that are possible but are not. We review
studies that use simple preference methods to identify factors that contribute to action
choices, especially for object-manipulation tasks. We can determine which factors are
especially important through simple behavioral experiments.
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INTRODUCTION
Actions make psychological activity tangible, for it is through
actions that decisions are expressed. To be on the frontier of psy-
chology, therefore, it is desirable not just to know what actions
are chosen but also how they are. The actions of interest can be
large-scale, as in deciding whether to stay in school or drop out;
or they can be small-scale, as in raising one’s eyebrow or nodding
in a way that conveys less than full agreement. The actions need
not be communicative, however. They can be purely functional,
as in reaching for a cup of coffee when one is alone. Such func-
tional actions can also be carried out in different ways, quickly and
assuredly, for example, or slowly and hesitantly.
Psychologists have paid little attention to the way actions are
physically expressed. Instead, they have typically focused on the
instrumental outcomes of behavior, the most famous example
being B. F. Skinner’s research, in which rats pressed on levers
or pigeons pecked on keys to get rewards or avoid punishments
(e.g., Skinner, 1969). How the rats pressed the levers or how the
pigeons pecked the keys were of less interest than which devices
were activated when.
The restriction of focus to switch closures, whether achieved
with limbs or beaks, is understandable when one’s methods of
recording behavior are primitive. It is much easier to record which
electrical switch is closed in a Skinner box than to quantify the
detailed properties of movement trajectories. Still, the manner in
which movements are made may be relevant not just for conveying
subtleties of communication or for determining whether a task is
performed confidently. How movements are made may also be
relevant for shedding light on motor control itself.
Consider the simple act of pressing an elevator button. An ele-
vator summoned by a button press is indifferent to the movements
made to press the button. Still, the movements made to press the
button are a concern for the person pressing the button. This is
obvious for someone with a movement disability, but even for
neurologically typical individuals, there is a non-trivial problem
to be solved in pressing an elevator button. The number of possible
joint configurations that let the finger press the button is limitless.
In addition, for any given joint configuration achieved at the time
of the press, the number of paths leading to that joint config-
uration is limitless as well. Finally, for every one of those paths
to the final configuration, the timing possibilities are boundless,
too. So even for a task as trivial as pressing an elevator button,
the number of possible actions is infinite. A core question in
motor control is how, for situations like this, particular actions
are chosen.
APPROACHES TO ACTION SELECTION
The problem of choosing actions in the sense just discussed was
first recognized by Bernstein (1967), who referred to the matter
as the degrees-of-freedom problem. As Bernstein appreciated, the
degrees of freedom of the body exceed the degrees of freedom asso-
ciated with the ostensive description of most tasks to be achieved.
An elevator button, for example, has six (positional) degrees of
freedom – the three spatial coordinates of its center, and the three
orientation coordinates of its plane (pitch, roll, and yaw). The
width of the button (governing its tolerance for aiming errors)
is relevant as well, as is the force needed to complete the press.
Summing up these degrees of freedom, there are eight of them.
The degrees of freedom of the body of a typical person intent
on pressing a button are vastly greater. Considering only the skele-
ton, a person’s upper arm has three degrees of freedom (rotation
about the x, y, and z axes), the forearm has two degrees of freedom
(flexion/extension and twisting), and each finger joint adds its own
degrees of freedom. Adding the joints of the spine, hip, knee, and
ankle, still more degrees of freedom come along. How the head is
oriented enters as well, how the eyes are oriented factors in, and
so on. Quickly, the bodily degrees of freedom exceed the eight
associated with the button, and this ignores the vicissitudes of the
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muscles affecting the joints and the nerves driving the muscles,
which create an even greater explosion of possibilities.
COUPLING
How can one make progress on the challenge of choosing
particular actions when infinitely many achieve a task? In the
literature on this topic three approaches have been taken. Two
were pursued by Bernstein (1967). A third emerged after him.
One approach that Bernstein (1967) pursued was to identify
functional dependencies between effectors. Bernstein’s idea was
that linkages between effectors could limit the degrees of freedom
to be controlled.
At an abstract level, this approach can be appreciated by consid-
ering Figure 1, which shows, in one case, two independent points
in a plane and, in the other, two points joined by a line of fixed
length. In the first case, there are four degrees of freedom: the x
and y values of point A, and the x and y values of point B. In the
second case, there are three degrees of freedom: the x and y of one
point and the angle of the line, whose length is fixed, from A to B.
This simple example, adapted from Saltzman (1979), shows how
coupling can reduce the degrees of freedom to be managed.
Does coupling exist in actual motor performance? The answer,
resoundingly, is Yes. As noticed by von Holst (1939), when fish
oscillate their dorsal fins and then start to oscillate their pec-
toral fins, the dorsal fin oscillations change. When von Holst asked
human subjects to do something similar, raise and lower one out-
stretched arm at a fixed frequency and then at other frequencies,
the oscillations of the control arm changed. Such limb interactions
occur reliably and have been studied in detail (e.g., Swinnen et al.,
1994).
What do these results imply about the degrees-of-freedom
problem? They might be taken to suggest that dependencies
between effectors obviate the problem, but there is a difficulty
with this suggestion. Linkages are not fixed but rather come and
go depending on what needs to be achieved. During speech, for
example, the upper lip moves down toward the lower lip more
quickly than usual if the lower lip rises more slowly than usual (and
vice versa), but this is only true when the sound to be produced
requires bilabial closure, as in “p” or “b.” It is not the case when the
sound to be produced is a fricative, as in “f” or “v” (Abbs, 1986).
FIGURE 1 | Effects of coupling on degrees of freedom. (A) Two
independent points (four degrees of freedom). (B) Two points joined by a
line of immutable length (three degrees of freedom).
The manifestation of coupling also depends on how the task
is presented. When the perceptual representation of the task is
simplified, actions that are otherwise difficult to perform can be
easy (Mechsner et al., 2001). Similarly, if the hands haptically
track moving objects, staying in light touch with the objects while
the objects move, two circularly moving objects turning at dif-
ferent frequencies can be haptically tracked essentially perfectly
no matter what the frequency relation between them. By contrast,
generating two circles with those same frequencies is nearly impos-
sible if the circles are drawn through more conventional means,
such as drawing them on a blackboard (Rosenbaum et al., 2006b).
MECHANICS
The second track that Bernstein (1967) pursued to address the
degrees-of-freedom problem was to appeal to exploitation of
mechanics. His idea was that action control can be simplified by
exploiting mechanical interactions between the body and outer
world.
Examples of motor performance that reflect exploitation of
mechanics abound. A delightful example concerns babies in Jolly
Jumpers. Suspended in their little seats, dangling via elastic chords
from firm hooks above, babies learn to push on the floor at just the
right pace and force to get the most “bang for the buck” (Goldfield
et al., 1993).
Once babies and toddlers learn to walk, they continue to exploit
mechanics. During mature walking there is a stance phase and a
swing phase for each foot. During the stance phase the foot is on
the ground, whereas during the swing phase the foot is off the
ground. During the swing phase there is remarkably little muscle
activity once the swing is initiated. The swing is completed, how-
ever, because the leg is swung forward and then pulled down via
gravity. It turns out that people switch from walking to running
as locomotion speed increases at just the speed where leg lower-
ing would occur more quickly than is achievable by letting gravity
pulling the leg down. At this critical speed, the transition is made
from walking (a series of controlled falls), to running (a series of
controlled leaps) (Alexander, 1984).
Does exploitation of mechanics solve the degrees-of-freedom
problem? Perhaps to some extent in some circumstances. For
example, exploitation of mechanics has been shown to be a useful
way to avoid copious computation for robot trajectories (Collins
et al., 2005). Still, it is unclear how far one can go with this
approach, for it fails to explain the richness and diversity of
voluntarily shaped performance.
CONSTRAINTS
If neither the coupling approach to the degrees-of-freedom prob-
lem nor the mechanics approach to the degrees-of-freedom prob-
lem fully solves the problem, what approach can do so? Toward
answering this question, it is useful to return to the way we intro-
duced the degrees-of-freedom problem earlier in this article. We
noted that Bernstein (1967) couched the problem in terms of the
degrees of freedom of the body relative to the degrees of freedom
associated with the ostensive description of the task to be achieved.
The key phrase for us as psychologists is “ostensive description.”
What we mean is that while a task description has some properties,
the individual approaching the task adds more properties to the
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognition June 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 273 | 2
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rosenbaum et al. Choosing actions
description – enough of them, in fact, to fully describe the problem
and thereby, in effect, solve it. For example, if the task is “to press
the elevator button,” the person about to perform this task might
add more constraints, such as “. . . with an effector that can easily
be brought to the button.” The effector might be the right index
finger, but if the individual were holding a squirming baby, some
other effector might be used instead.
Saying that constraints limit action choices raises the question
of how scientists can identify those constraints. To begin with,
note that if constraints limit the range of possible actions, the con-
straints that do so correspond to the features of actions that are
performed. Similarly, actions that could achieve the task but are
not performed lack those features. Not all constraints are equally
important, however. If an elevator button must be pushed, it is
probably more important to press the button with a finger than to
carry one’s finger to the button with some desired average speed.
Given this pair of points – that constraints are mirrored in the
features of selected actions and that some constraints are more
important than others – the challenge for psychologists interested
in action selection is to discover which constraints are more impor-
tant than which others. Determining the ranking or weighting of
constraints achieves two things. First, it obviates the need to say
which constraints are relevant and which are not. That is, instead
of adopting such a binary classification, all possible constraints
can be, and indeed must be, included. What distinguishes the con-
straints, then, is their weights. Some constraints have large weights.
Others have small weights, including weights that are vanishingly
small (i.e., nearly zero or zero itself).
Second, the weights of the constraints define the task as rep-
resented by the actor. This point is of inestimable importance for
psychology because so much of psychological research is about
performance of one task or another – the Stroop task, the Flanker
task, and so on. What a task is – how it is represented by some-
one performing it – is rarely considered, but the issue is core to
understanding action selection and psychology more broadly. If
a bus driver sees his task as setting people straight about how to
enter his bus, then the way his passengers feel about him will be
very different than if he sees his task as greeting his passengers as
warmly as he can.
A mathematical formalism can help pave the way for where we
will go with this. The formalism lets us depict tasks in an abstract
“task space” (Figure 2) and lets us introduce a hypothesis about
minimization of transitions within this space.
An elementary task, T, performed at time 1 can be defined
as a vector of constraint weights, w1,1 for constraint 1, w2,1 for
constraint 2, and so on, all the way up to constraint n at time 1.
T =

w1,1
w2,1
·
·
·
wn,1

The weights can be visualized as a point in task space, as seen in
Figure 2. The axes of the space correspond to the weights (between
0 and 1) for the possible constraints. Figure 2 shows just two
constraint weights, for graphical convenience. In this illustration,
ellipses contain the possible weights for achieving a given elemen-
tary task. A single point within the ellipse is highlighted to show
which weight combination is chosen.
It is also possible to consider series of elementary task solutions,
as shown in the next equation, where we extend the first equation
to one in which all the weights take on values for a range of times
from time 1 up to time t :
T =

w1,1 w1,2 w1,3 . . . w1,t
w2,1 w2,2 w2,3 . . . w2,t
· · · · ·
· · · · ·
· · · · ·
wn,1 wn,2 wn,3 . . . wn,t

FIGURE 2 | Actions selected from those that satisfy elementary task demands (enclosed in ellipses) defined by their locations in the two-dimensional
space of weights (0–1) for constraint 1 and constraint 2. A different first point is chosen in the left case and second.
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Two task series are shown in Figure 2. In the case on the left,
the first elementary task solution takes into account which point
will be chosen for the second elementary task. In the right panel,
though the set of possible solutions for the first elementary task is
the same as in the left panel, the weighting pair chosen within it is
different. The reason is that a different task is required next.
What we are saying is that actions may be selected in a way
that minimizes transitions through task space. This idea has been
appreciated before (e.g., Jordan and Rosenbaum, 1989) and is par-
ticularly well known in connection with speech co-articulation,
where the way a sound is produced depends on what sounds will
follow (Fowler, 2007).
OBJECT MANIPULATION
In our laboratories at Penn State and Utah State, we have been
concerned with manual control rather than speech control. Our
particular interest within the domain of manual control has been
object manipulation. Object manipulation is particularly interest-
ing to us because we take a cognitive approach to action selection.
In studies of object manipulation the same object can be used for
different purposes. A pen can be used for writing or for poking, a
knife can be used for slicing or for jabbing, and so on (Klatzky and
Lederman, 1987). This feature of object manipulation makes the
associated tasks attractive to us given our cognitive bent. The same
participant can be exposed to the same object in the same position
and can be instructed or otherwise induced to use the object with
different goals. Differences in the way participants grasp or handle
the object depending on the future task demands can be ascribed
to differences in the participants’ mental states.
ORDER OF PLANNING
Yet another attraction of object manipulation is that one can
study planning effects of different orders. One can look for first-
order planning effects, reflecting the influence of the object being
reached for in its present state; or one can look for second-order
planning effects, reflecting the influences of what is to be done next
with the object; or one can look for third-order planning effects,
reflecting the influences of what is to be done after that ; and so
on (Rosenbaum et al., 2012). The highest-order planning effect
that can be observed can be taken to reflect the planning span. For
discussions of planning spans for speaking and typewriting, see
Sternberg et al. (1978) and Logan (1983).
As long as there are second- or higher-order planning effects
in object manipulation, those effects can be viewed as manual
analogs of speech co-articulation. We can, in fact, coin a phrase to
highlight this association. Just as there are co-articulation effects
for speech, we can say there might be “co-manipulation” effects for
manual control.
One would expect co-manipulation effects if the cognitive sub-
strates of co-articulation extended to manual behavior. Saying this
another way, to the extent that manual control is present in many
animals whose evolutionary past does not yet equip them with the
capacity for speech, the capacity for co-manipulation may set the
stage for co-articulation.
NATURALISTIC OBSERVATION
Granted that co-manipulation would be interesting to discover,
how could one look for it? A first thought is to observe the
microscopic features of manual behavior in the laboratory, tak-
ing advantage of technical systems for recording and quantifying
properties of limb movements (e.g., Cai and Aggarwal, 1999). We
have used such systems in our research (e.g., Studenka et al., 2012).
However, the method we have generally favored has been simpler.
We have preferred to observe behavior in situations where there
are two easily observed ways of grasping any given object, espe-
cially when one of those ways can be plausibly linked to what will
be done with the object. We like this approach because it can be
pursued in the everyday environment, permitting or, better yet,
encouraging, naturalistic observation.
It was, in fact, a naturalistic observation that paved the way
for most of the research to be described in this article. While the
first author was eating at a restaurant, he observed a waiter fill-
ing glasses with water. Each glass was inverted and the waiter had
to turn each glass over to pour water into it. The waiter grasped
each glass with his thumb down, whereupon he turned the glass
over and poured water into the glass, holding the glass with his
thumb up. Finally, he set the filled glass down, keeping his thumb
up, and then proceeded to the next glass, turning his hand to the
thumb-down position as he prepared for the next episode of glass
filling.
The usual way of reaching for a glass is, of course, to take hold
of it with a thumb-up posture. Why, then, did the waiter grasp
the glass with his thumb down? Grasping an inverted glass with a
thumb-down posture afforded a thumb-up hold when the waiter
poured water into the glass and then set it down on the table. If
the glass had been picked up with the thumb up, the resulting
thumb-down posture would have made the subsequent pouring
and placement awkward. At extreme forearm rotation angles (e.g.,
thumb-down angles) as compared to less extreme forearm rotation
angles (e.g., thumb-up angles), rated comfort is lower (Rosen-
baum et al., 1990, 1992, 1993), muscular power is lower (Winters
and Kleweno, 1993), joint configuration variance is higher (Solnik
et al., 2013), and maximum oscillation rates, which are critical for
quick error correction, are lower as well (Rosenbaum et al., 1996).
For any of these reasons, it made sense for the waiter to grasp each
inverted glass as he did.
TWO-ALTERNATIVE FORCED CHOICE PROCEDURE
The waiter’s adoption of a thumb-down posture was consistent
with the model shown in Figure 2. The waiter’s decision to grasp
the glass thumb-down shows that he was aware of (or had learned)
what he would do next with the glass, so his action selection
reflected second-order (or possibly higher-order) planning.
The waiter’s maneuver was detected in a single naturalistic
observation, so it was important to replicate the result in the
laboratory. The laboratory method that was used relied on the
two-alternative forced choice procedure. The two alternatives per
trial were readily categorized actions, either of which was possible
for the task at hand but only one of which was typically preferred
(or expected to be preferred) over the other.
The logic of the approach was to find out how often one alter-
native was favored over the other depending on the nature of
the choice difference. The approach proved useful, as indicated
in the raft of studies that have used it (Rosenbaum et al., 2012).
In the present article, we cover some of the major results of this
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work, including several findings that emerged after preparation
of the review article just cited. Specifically, we review (1) findings
that have been obtained about choice of grasp orientation, both in
neurologically typical and neurologically atypical adults and chil-
dren and in non-human primates; (2) findings concerning grasp
locations along objects to be moved; and (3) findings concerning
selection of actions that involve walking as well as reaching.
GRASP ORIENTATION IN HEALTHY YOUNG ADULTS
The first laboratory test of the tendency to select initially distinct
grasp orientations in the service of later grasp orientations (Rosen-
baum et al., 1990), involved presenting university students with a
horizontally oriented wooden dowel resting on stands beneath the
dowel’s ends (Figure 3). One end of the dowel was white; the other
end was black. A circular disk target was placed on either side of
the stand, closer to where the participant stood, and the partici-
pant was asked to reach out with the right hand to grasp the dowel
and place either the black end or white end into a specified target.
The task used a two-alternative forced choice method, though the
two alternatives were not explicitly named for the participants.
They could either grasp the dowel with an overhand (palm down)
grasp, or they could grasp the dowel with an underhand (palm
up) grasp. The dowel placement could likewise end in either of
two ways: with a thumb-up posture or with a thumb-down pos-
ture. Ratings from the participants indicated that they found the
thumb-down posture uncomfortable. In addition, they found the
underhand (palm-up posture) less uncomfortable, and they found
the overhand (palm-down posture) and thumb-up posture least
uncomfortable (most comfortable).
For the action rather than the rating task, the main result was
that participants consistently chose an initial grasp orientation that
FIGURE 3 | Dowel task transport (Rosenbaum et al., 1990)
demonstrating the end-state comfort effect. In (A), the black and white
dowel rests on a cradle with a target on either side of the cradle. In (B) the
dowel’s black end was to be placed in the left or right target. In (C), the
dowel’s white end was to be placed in the left or right target. The numbers
near the black and white ends of the dowel represent the number of
participants who grasped the dowel with the thumb directed toward that
colored end of the dowel. (Image from Rosenbaum et al., 2006a.)
facilitated a thumb-up posture when the dowel was placed onto
the target. When the participants were asked to place the black
(left) end of dowel in the target, they picked up the dowel with an
overhand grasp, which allowed them to end in a thumb-up orien-
tation. By contrast, when participants were asked to place the white
(right) end of the dowel in the target, they picked up the dowel
using an underhand grasp, which also allowed them to end in the
same thumb-up orientation. Regardless of the end that needed to
be placed on the target, therefore, participants altered their initial
grasps in a way that ensured a comfortable final grasp orientation.
Rosenbaum et al. (1990) called this the end-state comfort effect.
After this first laboratory demonstration of the end-state com-
fort effect, many studies confirmed that the tendency to prioritize
the grasp orientation at the end of a movement emerges in a wide
variety of tasks. It was found that participants showed a prefer-
ence for end-state comfort when the dowel task was reversed, so
a vertical dowel was brought to a horizontal resting position; the
final posture was a comfortable palm-down posture (Rosenbaum
et al., 1990). When participants were asked to pick up an inverted
cup and fill it with water, they chose an initially uncomfortable
grasp and ended in a thumb-up grasp (Fischman, 1997). When
participants were asked to grasp a handle and turn it to rotate
a disk 180˚ so a tab would line up with a given location around
the disk’s perimeter (see Figure 4), participants adopted initially
uncomfortable grasps to ensure a comfortable grasp orientation
at the end of the rotation (Rosenbaum et al., 1993).
The end-state comfort effect emerged not only in single-hand
tasks, as just described, but also in bimanual tasks. In a biman-
ual version of the dowel transport task, participants grasped two
horizontal dowels, one with each hand, and moved them to two
vertical positions (Weigelt et al., 2006). Participants grasped the
dowels in a way that afforded comfortable thumb-up grasps at the
ends of the dowel transports. Participants in other experiments
behaved similarly (Janssen et al., 2009, 2010).
Subsequent studies showed that precision rather than end-state
comfort per se may be the decisive factor in second-order grasp
planning. Short and Cauraugh (1999) showed that participants
were less likely to grasp a dowel in a way that ensured end-state
comfort if the target to which the dowel was moved was wide
rather than narrow. A similar effect emerged in a unimanual disk
rotation task study in which participants were asked to take hold
of a handle in order to turn a lazy susan to an ending orientation
(Rosenbaum et al., 1996). In one condition, securing the ending
position took very little control, thanks to a bolt that stopped the
disk’s rotation. In that condition, only half the participants showed
the end-state comfort effect. By contrast, a much larger proportion
of participants showed the end-state comfort effect when they had
to control the final orientation through normal aiming.
All the results summarized in the last paragraph indicate that
the term “end-state comfort” may be a misnomer. Ending in a
comfortable state may be less important than occupying postures
affording the most control. For further evidence, see Künzell et al.
(in press).
GRASP PLANNING IN NON-HUMAN ANIMALS
The evidence just reviewed suggests that consideration of grasp
orientation is an important constraint guiding action selection in
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FIGURE 4 | Rotation task studied by Rosenbaum et al. (1993). In (A), a
participant stands in front of the wheel, which is oriented at a 45˚ angle,
after reaching out and grasping the handle. In (B), the numbered end
locations for the tab (bottom) are depicted for all possible targets, except
for 5, which is hidden by the tab. (Image from Rosenbaum et al., 2006a.)
object manipulation, at least in neuro-typical college students. Is
this factor also important in other populations?
Consider first performance by non-human primates. Studies
of object manipulation in non-human primates have shed light
on the evolutionary history of the cognitive capacities underly-
ing manual action selection. Weiss et al. (2007) tested cotton-top
tamarin monkeys on a modified version of the tasks described
above. As shown in Figure 5, these cotton-top tamarins were
presented with a food-baited champagne glass oriented upright
or inverted. The base of the glass was removed and a long rod
extended the glass’s stem. Both when the glass was upright or
inverted, a flat plate prevented the monkeys from reaching into
the glass to remove a marshmallow visible inside it. To retrieve the
food, each individually tested monkey had to slide the glass toward
him or herself to remove the marshmallow.
When the cup was upright, the tamarins grasped the stem
with a typical thumb-up orientation. More interestingly, when the
cup was inverted, the tamarins grasped the stem with an atypical
thumb-down orientation. In the latter case (as in the former) the
monkeys ended with the glass held thumb-up (see Figure 5). Thus,
the tamarins, like college students and waiters, prioritized comfort
(or presumed comfort) of final grasp orientations over prioritized
comfort (or presumed comfort) of initial grasp orientations. This
outcome suggests that the cognitive substrates for second-order
grasp planning may have been in place as long as 45 million years
ago, when the evolutionary line leading to tamarins diverged from
the evolutionary line leading to humans (Figure 6).
Can the lineage for such planning be placed even farther back
in time? Chapman et al. (2010) showed that it could. These
authors obtained the same grasp-planning effect when the cup task
(slightly modified) was used with lemurs. Lemurs are the most evo-
lutionarily distant living primate relatives of humans (Figures 6
and 7). The lemur line diverged from the anthropoid line (the line
leading to Homo sapiens) approximately 65 million years ago, or
20 million years earlier than for tamarins.
A final remark about evolution is that one would expect the
planning ability indexed by grasp planning also to exist for old
world monkeys and apes; otherwise, there would be a disconcert-
ing “hole” in the picture. Rhesus monkeys (Nelson et al., 2011)
and chimpanzees (Frey and Povinelli, 2012) also show sensitivity
to future grasp orientation requirements, so as far as we can tell,
then, the capacity for second-order grasp planning was in place as
long as 65 million years ago and has held fast since that time.
GRASP PLANNING IN BABIES, TODDLERS, AND CHILDREN
What about ontogenetic rather than phylogenetic development?
In humans, the species whose ontogenetic development is of most
interest to us, first-order grasp planning takes hold within the first
year of life. Babies modify their grasps according to the prop-
erties of objects they reach for. The relevant literature is briefly
reviewed in a textbook about motor control written mainly for
psychologists (Rosenbaum, 2010) and at greater length in a recent
handbook chapter (Savelsbergh et al., 2013).
In terms of the development of second-order grasp planning,
such planning appears in some toddlers at around 18 months of
age (Thibaut and Toussaint, 2010). Surprisingly, though, second-
order grasp planning as studied in the manner outlined earlier
does not reach adult-like competency until 9 or 10 years of age
(Hughes, 1996; Smyth and Mason, 1997; Manoel and Moreira,
2005; Thibaut and Toussaint, 2010; Weigelt and Schack, 2010;
Jovanovic and Schwarzer, 2011).
Several studies have also investigated child clinical populations.
Autistic children and mildly learning-disabled children show less
sensitivity to final grasp orientation than do age-matched controls
(Hughes, 1996). Less consistent sensitivity to final grasping pos-
ture is also seen in children with cerebral palsy (Crajé et al., 2010)
and in children with Williams’ syndrome (Newman, 2001).
GRASP PLANNING IN ADULT CLINICAL POPULATIONS
Studies of adult clinical populations have also revealed grasp-
planning deficits. In a task requiring participants to grasp a
dowel and rotate it to different positions, individuals with visual
agnosia did not consistently choose initial grasps that facili-
tated comfortable grasp orientations at the ends of the rotations
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FIGURE 5 | A cotton-top tamarin performing the cub extraction task of Weiss et al. (2007). In (A), the monkey grasps an upright cup’s stem using a
canonical thumb-up posture. In (B), the same monkey grasps the inverted cup’s stem using a non-canonical thumb-down posture. (Image from Weiss et al.,
2007.)
FIGURE 6 | Evolutionary tree stemming for a common primate
ancestor to prosimians (e.g., the ring-tailed lemur shown here), which
departed from the anthropoid line approximately 65 million years ago;
to New World monkeys (e.g., the cotton-top tamarin shown here),
which departed from the anthropoid line approximately 45 million
years ago; to Old World monkeys (e.g., the macaque shown here),
which departed from the anthropoid line approximately 30 million
years ago; and to Homo sapiens (e.g., Charles Darwin shown here).
(Dijkerman et al., 2009). Neither did adults with cerebral palsy
(Crajé et al., 2009) or with apraxia due to unilateral lesions
(Hermsdörfer et al., 1999). On a more up-beat note, adults with
autism spectrum disorder exhibited some sensitivity to end-state
comfort, not only in themselves but also in others, as shown in
a study of handing a tool to another person (Gonzalez et al.,
2013). The capacity for anticipating the needs of others was
FIGURE 7 | A ring-tailed lemur grasping an inverted cup’s stem using a
thumb-down posture. The lemur then inverted the cup to remove a raisin
from it. (Image from Chapman et al., 2010.)
less consistent in the autistic individuals than in their typically
developed age-matched peers, however.
GRASP HEIGHT
Constraints that come into play in planning for object
manipulation are not only revealed by grasp orientations; they
are also revealed by grasp locations. For example, when grasping
www.frontiersin.org June 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 273 | 7
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a glass to place it on a high shelf, a person might grasp the glass
low, near the base, to avoid an extreme stretch during the place-
ment. Similarly, when grasping a glass to place it on a low shelf,
the same person might grasp the same glass higher to avoid an
extreme downward stretch.
These expectation were borne out in a naturalistic observation
made by the first author at his home in the midst of returning a
toilet plunger to its normal position on the floor. The details of
the incident are unimportant. We will spare you! Suffice it to say
that the type of manipulandum for which the phenomenon first
appeared proved useful in laboratory experiments, where a fresh
plunger was used.
Participants were asked to place the plunger onto shelves of dif-
ferent heights (Cohen and Rosenbaum, 2004). As seen in Figure 8,
the plunger always began at the same location. The participant was
asked to take hold of it with the right hand in order to move it to
another shelf of variable height. When the plunger was grasped
to be placed on a high shelf, the grasp was low. Conversely, when
the plunger was grasped to be placed on a low shelf, the grasp
was high. In general, as seen in Figure 9, there was an inverse lin-
ear relation between target height (the independent variable) and
grasp height (the dependent variable) within the range of home
and target-heights studied.
This observed relation, which Cohen and Rosenbaum (2004)
called the grasp height effect, can be understood to reflect a desire
to avoid extreme joint angles, similar to what was seen for the
hand orientation effects described earlier. Also as for the hand
orientation effects, it turned out that required precision played an
important role. The grasp height effect was attenuated when place-
ment of the plunger on its target location required less precision
than when placement of the plunger on its target location required
a lot of precision (Rosenbaum et al., 2006a). This outcome sug-
gested that avoidance of extreme joint angles was sought when
greater control was needed, as concluded earlier in connection
with grasp orientations.
Another finding from the study of Cohen and Rosenbaum
(2004) shed light on the nature of the action selection process.
Cohen and Rosenbaum found that grasp heights depended not
just on upcoming task demands but also on previous actions. After
the plunger was brought from its home position to the target, the
participant lowered his or her hand and then returned the hand to
the plunger to bring the plunger back to the home position. When
participants did this, the grasp heights they adopted were very sim-
ilar to the grasp height just adopted for the home-to-target grasps
(Cohen and Rosenbaum, 2004). Thus, participants did not strive
for invariant end postures for the target-back-to-home transports.
If they had, they would have grasped the plunger higher from high
targets than they originally did (overcoming the tendency to grasp
low for high targets at the home site), and they would have grasped
the plunger lower from low targets than they originally did (over-
coming the tendency to grasp high for low targets at the home site).
What participants did instead was to grasp close to where they had
just grasped the plunger when they brought it to the target from
the home position.
A subsequent study showed that it was the location on the
plunger shift rather than the posture that participants recalled for
the return moves. Weigelt et al. (2007) showed this by having par-
ticipants step up onto, or down from, a stool after moving the
plunger from the home to the target and before returning to the
home position. Instead of adopting a posture like the one adopted
when holding the plunger on the target (just before releasing it),
which would have meant holding the plunger at a different point
along the shaft after stepping up or down, participants grasped
the plunger close to where they had grasped it before, even if
this required a very different posture. Thus, participants relied on
memory of the grasp location to guide their grasps for the return
trip. Relying on that strategy may have required fewer cognitive
resources than planning a new action from scratch every time.
How different a posture would be tolerated for the return trip is
still an open question.
REACHING ANDWALKING
The studies reviewed above concerned choices of grasps for forth-
coming object manipulations. The studies provided evidence for
second-order planning at least. The studies showed that grasps are
not just adjusted according to the immediate demands of taking
hold of an object based on its currently perceived properties (first-
order planning), but instead also depend on what will be done
FIGURE 8 |Two of the conditions studied by Cohen and
Rosenbaum (2004) in their demonstration of the grasp height
effect. The plunger occupies the same starting position in both
conditions shown here (and in all five target-height conditions tested).
Each participant was instructed to keep his or her left hand in his or
her left pocket and to begin each trial with the right-hand hanging by
the participant’s side. Left panel : the highest target shelf tested.
Right panel : the lowest target shelf tested. The experimenter is the
first author of the present article. The participant gave permission to
have his face shown.
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FIGURE 9 |The grasp height effect. From Cohen and Rosenbaum (2004).
with the object afterward. For evidence that grasp planning can go
beyond the second-order, see Haggard (1998).
Grasp features are not the only aspects of behavior that provide
evidence for higher-order object-manipulation planning. Con-
sider a study by Studenka et al. (2012). They asked participants
to engage in the everyday task of opening a drawer to grasp
an object inside. When participants knew that no object had to
be grasped (i.e., they would simply open the drawer) they held
the grasping arm lower for the drawer opening than when they
knew they would lift an object from the drawer after opening
it. Not only was the arm higher in the lifting condition than in
the non-lifting condition; the joint angles were also more sim-
ilar to those that would be adopted for the lift. This outcome
is similar to the grasp height effect of Cohen and Rosenbaum
(2004) in that it reflects assimilation: features of upcoming behav-
ior are reflected in behavior that comes before. Such assimilation
reflects the tendency to minimize differences between immedi-
ately forthcoming postures and subsequent postures, as shown in
Figure 2.
STANDING FOR OBJECT MANIPULATION
Whereas Studenka et al. (2012) looked at arm configurations, it
is also possible to look at more macroscopic aspects of behav-
ior to draw inferences about action planning in the context of
object manipulation. Specifically, it is possible to study how peo-
ple approach a space where they know they will manipulate an
object. People approaching the space must project themselves to a
new position, often in a very different part of space than the one
they currently occupy. How they do so is a topic of longstanding
interest in psychology.
Little research has been done on whole-body planning of object
manipulation, but some work has been done on it in our lab at
Penn State. van der Wel and Rosenbaum (2007) asked how people
walk up to a table to move a plunger to the left or right over a
long or short distance. The long distance was 120% of the sub-
ject’s arm length; the short distance was 20% of the subject’s arm
length. Participants began each trial standing some distance from
the table: one, two, three, or four steps from the table, where“steps”
were defined for each participant based on his or her height. Par-
ticipants could use whichever hand they wished to perform the
plunger displacement task, which involved lifting the plunger and
then setting it down the long or short distance away toward the
left or right.
The main result was that participants preferred to stand on
the foot opposite the direction of forthcoming object displace-
ment if the displacement was large. If the displacement was small,
participants displayed no foot preference at the time of manual
displacement.
Why did participants stand on the opposite foot for large dis-
placements? Doing so made it possible for participants to rock in
the direction of the upcoming manual displacement, landing on
the foot ipsilateral to the placement. No such rocking was observed
when the manual displacements were small.
What was the effect of the participants’ initial distance from
the table? To the surprise of van der Wel and Rosenbaum (2007),
there was a stronger preference to stand on the foot contralateral
to the large forthcoming object shift when participants initially
stood far from the table than when participants initially near the
table (Figure 10). The reason for this outcome was not entirely
clear. Participants may have thought they could not navigate as
well to position their feet as they wished when they began close to
the table. With more steps, however, they may have had had more
of a chance to adjust their foot positions.
The latter hypothesis was confirmed through an analysis of
changes in step lengths as a function of starting distance from the
table. van der Wel and Rosenbaum (2007) found that the greater
the starting distance, the more the step lengths changed as par-
ticipants approached the table. So as participants approached the
table, they altered their steps to afford contralateral foot support
at the time of the large manual displacement.
These results, along with the others summarized in this section,
suggest that participants could project themselves into the posi-
tions they would need (or want) to adopt for the manual transfers
they would perform.
WALKING FOR OBJECT MANIPULATION
If people can mentally project themselves to future body positions,
might they also be able to project themselves moving through those
positions? Might they, in other words, be able to imagine them-
selves carrying out object manipulations while moving through
the environment – for example, while grabbing items from a
supermarket shelf during a trip down the aisle?
That people can coordinate their reaching and walking in cog-
nitively impressive ways was shown by Marteniuk and Bertram
(2001), who compared hand trajectories produced by people mov-
ing a cup from one position to another either while standing still
or while walking. As seen in Figure 11, the hand paths were vir-
tually identical in the two cases, at least when the hand paths
were depicted in external, spatial coordinated. When the hand
paths were depicted in intrinsic, joint-based coordinates, they were
strikingly different.
This finding is reminiscent of a classic result reported 20 years
earlier. In that study, Morasso (1981) found that hand paths for
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FIGURE 10 | Mean observed proportion of trials in which participants
stood on the right foot when they grasped a plunger to move it far to
the left, near to the left, near to the right, or far from the right, plotted
as a function of the distance from the table at the start of each trial.
From van der Wel and Rosenbaum (2007).
FIGURE 11 | Vertical displacement of a hand-held cup as a function of
horizontal displacement of the same cup when standing (left column)
or walking (right column) and when the data are plotted in extrinsic
spatial coordinates (top row) or intrinsic joint coordinates (bottom
row). Adapted from Marteniuk and Bertram (2001).
point-to-point reaching movements were nearly straight in extrin-
sic spatial coordinates but were often curved and highly complex
in intrinsic, joint-based coordinates. Morasso’s result suggested
that the motor system puts a premium on generating movements
defined with respect to external coordinates. The complexity of
motions in intrinsic coordinates suggests that the intrinsic control
system – the one responsible for moving and stabilizing muscles –
is extremely “clever,” somewhat like a highly skilled secretary who
works behind the scenes to keep his or her boss looking good
(Rosenbaum and Dawson, 2004). In the case of Marteniuk and
Bertram’s (2001)result, the fact that the motor system could gen-
erate simple hand paths in extrinsic space even when people were
walking is a stunning result. Developing a computational model
capable of simulating this capability will be a worthwhile aim for
future research.
In the walk-and-reach study of Marteniuk and Bertram (2001),
the topic of interest was participants’ ongoing behavior. An issue
that was not addressed in that report was how far in advance peo-
ple planned their walks and reaches. That is a topic for which most
of the research we know of has come from our own laboratory,
where again we have found it useful to rely on the two-alternative
forced choice procedure.
In one of our experiments (Rosenbaum et al., 2011), we asked
participants to pick up a child’s beach bucket on a table and carry
it to either of two sites beyond the table (Figure 12). To pick up
the bucket, the participant could either walk along the left or right
side of the table. If the participant walked along the left side of
the table, he or she was supposed to pick up the bucket with the
right hand and carry it to a target site (a stool) beyond the table’s
left end. If the participant walked along the right side of the table,
he or she was supposed to pick up the bucket with the left hand
and carry it to a target site (a different stool) beyond the table’s
right end. In different trials, the left and right target sites (the left
and right stools) occupied different distances from the end of the
table. Crossed with this variable, the bucket was close to the left
edge of the table, in the middle of the table, or close to the right
edge of the table.
Given these possible arrangements, it was possible to study the
costs of walking versus reaching. In some conditions, participants
had no conflict between these two costs. For example, participants
had no conflict if the bucket was near the left edge of the table, the
left target was close, and the right target was far away (top panel of
Figure 12). However, if the bucket was near the right edge of the
table, the left target was nearby, and the right target was far away
(middle panel of Figure 12), participants had a conflict. In that
case, participants could either walk along the right side of the table,
reaching less but walking more, or they could walk along the left
side of the table, reaching more but walking less. Finally, in terms
of the examples reviewed here (just some of the conditions tested),
if the bucket was in the middle of the table and the left target was
farther away than the right (bottom panel of Figure 12), partici-
pants could walk less by walking along the right side of the table,
or they could walk more, walking along the left side of the table,
reaching just as far in both cases. If they walked more, they would
have to use the less favored hand (the left hand for the participants
in this study).
So what was more important, walking less or reaching with the
hand that was preferred? With the tasks used, which go beyond
those reviewed above, Rosenbaum et al. (2011) could estimate the
relative costs of walking over some distance versus reaching over
some distance, and they could estimate the relative cost of reach-
ing with the left hand or right. The way they estimated the relative
costs is reflected in Figure 13, which shows the probability, p(L),
that participants walked along the left side of the table plotted as a
function of the difference between two derived measures,“left path
functional distance”and“right path functional distance.”Left path
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FIGURE 12 |Three arrangements used by Rosenbaum et al. (2011) to
study walking and reaching. In all cases, the participant stood at the site
where these photographs were taken.Top panel : bucket near the left edge
of the table and the left target stool is nearby. Middle panel : bucket near
the right edge of the table and the left target stool is again nearby. Bottom
panel : bucket in the middle of the table and the right target stool is nearby.
Adapted from Rosenbaum (2012).
FIGURE 13 | Probability, p(L), of choosing to walk along the left side of
the table (Rosenbaum, 2012). Left path functional distance was defined
as walking distance+10.3× right-hand reaching distance. Right path
functional distance was defined as walking distance+12.3× left-hand
reaching distance, all in meters (m). Adapted from Rosenbaum (2012).
functional distance was defined as the sum of the walking distance
(in meters) plus the right-hand reaching distance (also in meters),
with the latter term being multiplied by an empirically fit constant.
Similarly, right path functional distance was defined as the sum of
the walking distance (in meters) plus the left-hand reaching dis-
tance (also in meters), with the latter term being multiplied by
another empirically fit constant. The empirically fit constant for
the right hand was 10.3. The empirically fit constant for the left
hand was 12.3. Based on these two values, it was possible to say
that right-hand reaching was less costly than left-hand reaching
(10.3 compared to 12.3) and that reaching over some distance was
much more costly than walking over that same distance, 11.3 times
more costly, in fact (the mean of 10.3 and 12.3).
Two further remarks are worth making about the study just
reviewed. First, the study was aimed at showing how different
kinds of costs are considered together. A priori, it is not obvious
how walking costs and reaching costs are co-evaluated in the plan-
ning of walking and reaching. The study just summarized shows
that it is possible to find a common currency for evaluation of
the two kinds of costs. That common currency is (or is analogous
to) “functional distance,” defined as the weighted combination of
walking distance and reaching distance. Presumably, the weights
would change if walking were challenged more (e.g., by adding leg
loads) or if reaching were challenged more (e.g., by adding wrist
loads). Being able to estimate mathematical weights such as these
is central to the general approach outlined here because, as stated
in the introduction of this paper, we believe that tasks can be rep-
resented as vectors of weights for dimensions on which tasks vary
(see Figure 2).
The second remark is that the study just reviewed was done by
having participants actually walk and reach in the environment
depicted in Figure 12. The study was later repeated by showing a
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new group of participants (another group of Penn State under-
graduates) pictures of the environment in which the real task
had been done, photographed from the perspective of someone
standing where participants stood at the start of each real-action
trial (Rosenbaum, 2012). Examples of those images are shown in
Figure 12. In each experimental trial, one image was shown on
a computer and the participant either pressed a left key, indicat-
ing that s/he would walk along the left edge of the table (carrying
the bucket with the right hand to the left target), or the right key,
indicating that s/he would walk along the right edge of the table
(carrying the bucket with the left hand to the right target). There
was no time pressure, just as in the“real-action”experiment. More-
over, participants were allowed to hold and heft the bucket (which
was empty) before doing the computerized “virtual-action” task.
The result of the virtual-action study was that the choices par-
ticipants made when they indicated how they would do the task
were almost identical to the choices made by participants who
actually did the task. The result lent credence to the impression
that Rosenbaum et al. (2011) had when they ran their experiment,
that their real-action participants knew which way they would go
as soon as they left the start point.
It also happened that in the virtual-action study of Rosenbaum
(2012), the choice reaction times were longer the more similar the
functional path lengths of the left and right paths. This outcome
let Rosenbaum (2012) reject the hypothesis that participants men-
tally simulated one task alternative and then the other, choosing
whichever seemed easier. Such a serial simulation method would
have resulted in a different pattern of choice reaction times than the
one obtained. The choice reaction times would have grown with
the sum of the left and right functional path lengths rather being
inversely related to the difference between the two path lengths, as
found.
Did it make sense that participants did not rely on serial
simulations to choose their actions in this reach-and-walk task?
Rosenbaum (2012) suggested that it did. By analogy to someone
being chased by a tiger, if you had a tiger on your tail, the tiger
would have you for lunch if you fully simulated alternative escape
paths. If you stood at a choice point, blithely imaging yourself
going one way or the other, you would probably land in the tiger’s
jaws. A more efficient method would be to compare critical differ-
ences between the paths, quickly choosing your action based on
differences between the alternatives. The time to choose between
the paths would grow with their similarity, as was found in the
virtual-action task of Rosenbaum (2012) and as is typically found
in studies of perceptual discrimination (e.g., Johnson, 1939).
CONCLUSION
The research summarized in this article has been concerned with
choosing between actions expressed at the relatively low level of
carrying out movements, especially with the hands and legs in the
context of object manipulation. As noted in the introduction, there
has been relatively little attention paid to the motor system in psy-
chology, which is odd considering that psychology is the science
of mental life and behavior, whereas motor control is the science
of how one gets from mental life to behavior.
The latter definition might not be the one that most motor-
control researchers spontaneously provide when asked to define
their field, for most motor-control researchers typically come from
engineering or neuroscience. That issue aside, it is not always clear
that to understand motor control, one must invoke mental states.
Some aspects of motor control are explicitly removed from mental
states in that they rely on mechanical properties of the neuro-
muscular and skeletal system, sometimes obviating the need for
planning or control, as discussed in Section“Mechanics.”Similarly,
reflexive (highly automatic) responses might not require extensive
mental involvement. Even in the case of simple tasks where reflexes
seem sufficient, mental states turn out to have a tuning function,
as reviewed in Section “Coupling.” Thus, mental states are essen-
tial for motor control, just as motor control is essential for the
expression of mental states.
Why motor control has received short shrift in psychology is
an interesting topic that, among other things, tells psychologists
about their values (Rosenbaum, 2005). One hypothesis about
why psychologists have not pursued motor-control research as
actively as they might have is that they think the methods that
are needed are extremely technical, so that, to make any kind
of progress, one has to record the electrical activity of muscles,
for example, or the detailed kinematic properties of the limbs
with expensive equipment. As we have tried to show here, how-
ever, simple behavioral methods can be profitably applied to the
study of motorically expressed action choices. None of the studies
described here (from our lab) required exotic or highly technical
equipment. The equipment that was needed to do the studies we
have summarized has been limited to tables, stools, beach buck-
ets, toilet plungers, wooden dowels, wooden disks, webcams, and
laptop computers.
Even with such primitive materials, however, we have arrived at
some useful conclusions. The first of these is that different tasks can
be represented in terms of the weights assigned to different perfor-
mance variables. No matter how obvious this point is, it actually
diverges from a prevailing view in engineering-inspired motor-
control research – namely, that there is some single optimization
variable that governs motor control. Various candidates for this
single optimization variable have been suggested over the years,
including minimization of mean squared jerk (Hogan, 1984), min-
imization of mean squared torque change (Uno et al., 1989), and
minimization of endpoint variance (Harris and Wolpert, 1998).
But movements do not always satisfy these constraints. Indeed, the
flexibility of performance – for example, the possibility of making
high-jerk bow strokes while playing the violin with staccato style
versus making very smooth bow strokes while playing the violin
with legato style – reflects the opposite of unstinting loyalty to one
fixed optimization constraint. Rather, it reflects the possibility of
re-prioritizing constraints according to the task to be achieved.
The essence of skill, we believe, is being able to re-prioritize con-
straints, not being locked into prioritizing constraints in a fixed
fashion.
Our second conclusion is that identifying the priorities of con-
straints for a task need not be viewed as an elusive goal. Instead,
it is a reachable goal if one is willing simply to try to find out
which means of achieving a task are preferred over others. All the
presently reviewed experiments (from our lab) had this goal. What
was common to all the experiments was the aim of determining
which performance variables participants cared about more than
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others. To answer this question, we relied on ratings, measures of
performance quality, and, especially, two-alternative forced choice
preferences.
Our third and final conclusion concerns embodied cognition.
This has become a very popular topic lately. The embodiment
perspective is one that we find congenial given our interest in
motor control, but the discussion of embodiment has glossed over
the details of motor performance. Saying that perception implic-
itly calls up a response is fine as far as it goes, but a “response”
is actually an equivalence class of possible movement solutions,
as detailed here. Therefore, turning to a familiar example from
the embodied-cognition literature (Glenberg and Kaschak, 2002),
reading a sentence about opening a drawer may evoke a drawer-
opening response, but there isn’t a single movement that achieves
drawer opening, as discussed earlier in connection with the study
of Studenka et al. (2012). Likewise, saying that embodiment may
entail simulating actions is only theoretically helpful up to a point.
As we have argued here in connection with the study of choosing
between walking-and-reaching routes (Rosenbaum, 2012), sim-
ulation may not be used, at least judging from the fact that the
time to choose between the routes was not predicted by the sum
of their lengths. Other studies from our lab, not reviewed here
(Walsh and Rosenbaum, 2009; Coelho et al., 2012) have also cast
doubt on a naïve account of motor imagery according to which
actions are chosen by running mental movies of the actions in
order to find out which is better or best; see also Cisek (2012).
Were such a method to be used, we probably would not have sur-
vived in the jungles from which we evolved. The methods we use
to choose actions are honed by eons of selective pressure. The fea-
tures of actions that are preferred are ones that have been selected
for and that the experiments summarized here have been aimed at
identifying.
REFERENCES
Abbs, J. H. (1986). “Invariance and
variability in speech production: a
distinction between linguistic intent
and its neuromotor implementa-
tion,” in Invariance and Variability in
Speech Processes, eds J. S. Perkell, and
D. H. Klatt (Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum),
202–219.
Alexander, R. M. (1984). Walking and
running. Am. Sci. 72, 348–354.
Bernstein, N. (1967). The Coordina-
tion and Regulation of Movements.
London: Pergamon.
Cai, Q., and Aggarwal, J. K. (1999).
Tracking human motion in struc-
tured environments using a
distributed-camera system. IEEE
Trans. Pattern Anal. Mach. Intell. 21,
1241–1247.
Chapman, K. M., Weiss, D. J., and
Rosenbaum, D. A. (2010). The evo-
lutionary roots of motor plan-
ning: the end-state comfort effect
in lemurs. J. Comp. Psychol. 124,
229–232.
Cisek, P. (2012). Making decisions
through a distributed consen-
sus. Curr. Opin. Neurobiol. 22,
927–936.
Coelho, C. J., Nusbaum, H. C., Rosen-
baum, D. A., and Fenn, K. M.
(2012). Imagined actions aren’t just
weak actions: task variability pro-
motes skill learning in physical prac-
tice but not in mental practice. J.
Exp. Psychol. Learn. Mem. Cogn. 38,
1759–1764.
Cohen, R. G., and Rosenbaum, D.
A. (2004). Where objects are
grasped reveals how grasps are
planned: generation and recall of
motor plans. Exp. Brain Res. 157,
486–495.
Collins, S., Ruina, A., Tedrake, R., and
Wisse, M. (2005). Efficient bipedal
robots based on passive-dynamic
walkers. Science 307, 1082–1085.
Crajé, C., Aarts, P., Nijhuis-van der
Sanden, M., and Steenbergen, B.
(2010). Action planning in typical
and atypical developing children.
Res. Dev. Disabil. 31, 1039–1046.
Crajé, C., van der Kamp, J., and Steen-
bergen, B. (2009). Visual informa-
tion for action planning in left and
right congenital hemiparesis. Brain
Res. 1261, 54–64.
Dijkerman, H. C., McIntosh, R. D.,
Schindler, I., Nijboer, T. C. W.,
and Milner, A. D. (2009). Choosing
between alternative wrist postures:
action planning needs perception.
Neuropsychologia 47, 1476–1482.
Fischman, M. G. (1997). End-state com-
fort in object manipulation. Res.
Q. Exerc. Sport, 68(Suppl.), A60.
[Abstract].
Fowler, C. A. (2007). “Speech pro-
duction,” in The Oxford Hand-
book of Psycholinguistics, ed. M. G.
Gaskell (New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press), 489–502.
Frey, S. H., and Povinelli, D. J. (2012).
Comparative investigations of man-
ual action representations: evidence
that chimpanzees represent the costs
of potential future actions involving
tools. Philos. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B
Biol. Sci. 367, 48–58.
Glenberg, A. M., and Kaschak, M.
P. (2002). Grounding language
in action. Psychon. Bull. Rev. 9,
558–565.
Goldfield, E. C., Kay, B. A., and War-
ren, W. H. (1993). Infant bouncing:
the assembly and tuning of action
systems. Child Dev. 64, 1128–1142.
Gonzalez, D. A., Glazebrook, C. M.,
Studenka, B. E., and Lyons, J.
(2013). Motor interactions with
another person: do individuals with
autism spectrum disorder plan
ahead? Front. Integr. Neurosci. 7:23.
doi:10.3389/fnint.2013.00023
Haggard, P. (1998). Planning of action
sequences. Acta Psychol. (Amst.) 99,
201–215.
Harris, C. M., and Wolpert, D.
M. (1998). Signal-dependent noise
determines motor planning. Nature
394, 780–784.
Hermsdörfer, J., Laimgruber, K., Kerk-
hoff, G., Mai, N., and Goldenberg,
G. (1999). Effects of unilateral brain
damage on grip selection, coordi-
nation, and kinematics of ipsile-
sional prehension. Exp. Brain Res.
128, 41–51.
Hogan, N. (1984). An organizing prin-
ciple for a class of voluntary move-
ments. J. Neurosci. 4, 2745–2754.
Hughes, C. (1996). Planning problems
in autism at the level of motor
control. J. Autism Dev. Disord. 26,
99–107.
Janssen, L., Beuting, M., Meulenbroek,
R., and Steenbergen, B. (2009).
Combined effects of planning and
execution constraints on bimanual
task performance. Exp. Brain Res.
192, 61–73.
Janssen, L., Crajé, C., Weigelt, M., and
Steenbergen, B. (2010). Motor plan-
ning in bimanual object manipula-
tion: two plans for two hands? Motor.
Control. 14, 240–254.
Johnson, D. M. (1939). Confidence and
speed in the two-category judgment.
Arch. Psychol. 241, 1–52.
Jordan, M. I., and Rosenbaum, D. A.
(1989). “Action,” in Foundations of
Cognitive Science, ed. M. I. Pos-
ner (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press),
727–767.
Jovanovic, B., and Schwarzer, G. (2011).
Learning to grasp efficiently: the
development of motor planning and
the role of observational learning.
Vision Res. 51, 945–954.
Klatzky, R. L., and Lederman, S. J.
(1987). “The intelligent hand,” in
Psychology of Learning and Moti-
vation, Vol. 21, ed. G. H. Bower
(San Deigo, CA: Academic Press),
121–151.
Künzell, S., Augste, C., Hering, M.,
Maier, S., Meinzinger, A.-M., and
Siessmeir, D. (in press). Optimal
control in the critical part of the
movement: a functional approach
to motor planning processes. Acta
Psychol. (Amst.).
Logan, G. D. (1983). “Time, infor-
mation, and the various spans in
typewriting,” in Cognitive Aspects
of Skilled Typewriting, ed. W.
E. Cooper (New York: Springer-
Verlag), 197–224.
Manoel, E. J., and Moreira, C. R. P.
(2005). Planning manipulative hand
movements: do young children show
the end-state comfort effect? J. Hum.
Mov. Stud. 49, 93–114.
Marteniuk, R. G., and Bertram, C. P.
(2001). Contributions of gait and
trunk movement to prehension: per-
spectives from world and body-
centered coordinates. Motor Control
5, 151–164.
Mechsner, F., Kerzel, D., Knoblich,
G., and Prinz, W. (2001). Percep-
tual basis of bimanual coordination.
Nature 414, 69–73.
Morasso, P. (1981). Spatial control of
arm movements. Exp. Brain Res. 42,
223–227.
Nelson, E. L., Berthier, N. E., Metevier,
C. M., and Novak, M. A. (2011).
Evidence for motor planning
in monkeys: rhesus macaques
select efficient grips when trans-
porting spoons. Dev. Sci. 14,
822–831.
www.frontiersin.org June 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 273 | 13
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rosenbaum et al. Choosing actions
Newman, C. (2001). The Planning and
Control of Action in Normal Infants
and Children with Williams Syn-
drome. London: University College
London. [unpublished doctoral dis-
sertation].
Rosenbaum, D. A. (2005). The Cin-
derella of psychology: the neglect of
motor control in the science of men-
tal life and behavior. Am. Psychol. 60,
308–317.
Rosenbaum, D. A. (2010). Human
Motor Control, 2nd Edn. San Diego,
CA: Academic Press/Elsevier.
Rosenbaum, D. A. (2012). The tiger
on your tail: choosing between tem-
porally extended behaviors. Psychol.
Sci. 23, 855–860.
Rosenbaum, D. A., Brach, M., and
Semenov,A. (2011). Behavioral ecol-
ogy meets motor behavior: choos-
ing between walking and reach-
ing paths. J. Mot. Behav. 43,
131–136.
Rosenbaum, D. A., Chapman, K. M.,
Weigelt, M., Weiss, D. J., and van der
Wel, R. (2012). Cognition, action,
and object manipulation. Psychol.
Bull. 138, 924–946.
Rosenbaum, D. A., Cohen, R. G., Meu-
lenbroek, R. G., and Vaughan, J.
(2006a).“Plans for grasping objects,”
in Motor Control and Learning over
the Lifespan, eds M. Latash and
F. Lestienne (New York: Springer),
9–25.
Rosenbaum, D. A., Dawson, A. M., and
Challis, J. H. (2006b). Haptic track-
ing permits bimanual independence.
J. Exp. Psychol. Hum. Percept. Per-
form. 32, 1266–1275.
Rosenbaum, D. A., and Dawson, A. M.
(2004). The motor system computes
well but remembers poorly. J. Mot.
Behav. 36, 390–392.
Rosenbaum, D. A., Heugten, C., and
Caldwell, G. C. (1996). From cog-
nition to biomechanics and back:
the end-state comfort effect and the
middle-is-faster effect. Acta Psychol.
(Amst.) 94, 59–85.
Rosenbaum, D. A., Marchak, F., Barnes,
H. J., Vaughan, J., Slotta, J., and
Jorgensen, M. (1990). “Constraints
for action selection: overhand versus
underhand grips,” in Attention and
Performance XIII: Motor Representa-
tion and Control, ed. M. Jeannerod
(Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum
Associates), 321–342.
Rosenbaum, D. A., Vaughan, J., Barnes,
H. J., and Jorgensen, M. J. (1992).
Time course of movement plan-
ning: selection of hand grips
for object manipulation. J. Exp.
Psychol. Learn. Mem. Cogn. 18,
1058–1073.
Rosenbaum, D. A., Vaughan, J., Jor-
gensen, M. J., Barnes, H. J., and
Stewart, E. (1993). “Plans for object
manipulation,” in Attention and Per-
formance XIV – A Silver Jubilee:
Synergies in Experimental Psychology,
Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive
Neuroscience, eds D. E. Meyer and
S. Kornblum (Cambridge: Bradford
Books), 803–820.
Saltzman, E. (1979). Levels of sensori-
motor representation. J. Math. Psy-
chol. 20, 91–163.
Savelsbergh, G., van der Kamp, J., and
van Wersmerskerken, M. (2013).
“The development of reaching
actions,” in The Oxford Hand-
book of Developmental Psychology,
Vol. 1: Body and Mind, ed. P. D.
Zelazo (New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press), 380–402.
Short, M. W., and Cauraugh, J. H.
(1999). Precision hypothesis and the
end-state comfort effect. Acta Psy-
chol. (Amst.) 100, 243–252.
Skinner, B. F. (1969). Contingencies of
Reinforcement: A Theoretical Analy-
sis. New York: Appleton-Century-
Crofts.
Smyth, M. M., and Mason, U. C.
(1997). Planning and execution of
action in children with or without
developmental coordination disor-
der. J. Child Psychol. Psychiatry 38,
1023–1037.
Solnik, S., Pazin, N., Coelho, C. J.,
Rosenbaum, D. A., Scholz, J. P., Zat-
siorksy,V. M., et al. (2013). End-state
comfort and joint configuration
variance during reaching. Exp. Brain
Res. 225, 431–442.
Sternberg, S., Monsell, S., Knoll, R.
L., and Wright, C. E. (1978).
“The latency and duration of
speech and typewriting,” in Infor-
mation Processing in Motor Con-
trol and Learning, ed. G. E. Stel-
mach (New York: Academic Press),
117–152.
Studenka, B. E., Seegelke, C., Schütz,
C., and Schack, T. (2012). Posture
based motor planning in a sequen-
tial grasping task. J. Appl. Res. Mem.
Cogn. 1, 89–95.
Swinnen, S. P., Heuer, H., and Casaer,
P. (1994). Interlimb Coordination:
Neural, Dynamical, and Cognitive
Constraints. San Diego: Academic
Press.
Thibaut, J.-P., and Toussaint, L. (2010).
Developing motor planning over
ages. J. Exp. Child. Psychol. 105,
116–129.
Uno, Y., Kawato, M., and Suzuki, R.
(1989). Formation and control of
optimal trajectory in human mul-
tijoint arm movement. Minimum
torque-change model. Biol. Cybern.
61, 89–101.
van der Wel, R. P., and Rosenbaum, D.
A. (2007). Coordination of locomo-
tion and prehension. Exp. Brain Res.
176, 281–287.
von Holst, E. (1939). Die relative
Koordination als Phänomenon und
als Methode zentral-nervöse Funk-
tionsanalyze. Ergeb. Physiol. 42,
228–306. [English translation in von
Holst, E. (1973). “Relative coordi-
nation as a phenomenon and as a
method of analysis of central ner-
vous functions,” in The Behavioural
Physiology of Animal and Man: The
Collected Papers of Erich von Holst,
Vol. 1, Trans. R. Martin. London:
Methuen].
Walsh, M. M., and Rosenbaum,
D. A. (2009). Deciding how to
act is not achieved by watching
mental movies. J. Exp. Psy-
chol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 35,
1481–1489.
Weigelt, M., Cohen, R. G., and
Rosenbaum, D. A. (2007). Return-
ing home: locations rather than
movements are recalled in human
object manipulation. Exp. Brain Res.
149, 191–198.
Weigelt, M., Kunde, W., and Prinz, W.
(2006). End-state comfort in biman-
ual object manipulation. Exp. Psy-
chol. 53, 143–148.
Weigelt, M., and Schack, T. (2010). The
development of end-state comfort
planning in preschool children. Exp.
Psychol. 57, 476–482.
Weiss, D. J.,Wark, J. D., and Rosenbaum,
D. A. (2007). Monkey see, monkey
plan, monkey do: the end-state com-
fort effect in cotton-top tamarins
(Saguinus oedipus). Psychol. Sci. 18,
1063–1068.
Winters, J. M., and Kleweno, D. G.
(1993). Effect of initial upper-limb
alignment on muscle contributions
to isometric strength curves. J. Bio-
mech. 26, 143–153.
Conflict of Interest Statement: The
authors declare that the research was
conducted in the absence of any com-
mercial or financial relationships that
could be construed as a potential con-
flict of interest.
Received: 22 April 2013; accepted: 27
April 2013; published online: 03 June
2013.
Citation: Rosenbaum DA, Chapman
KM, Coelho CJ, Gong L and Studenka BE
(2013) Choosing actions. Front. Psychol.
4:273. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00273
This article was submitted to Frontiers
in Cognition, a specialty of Frontiers in
Psychology.
Copyright © 2013 Rosenbaum, Chap-
man, Coelho, Gong and Studenka. This
is an open-access article distributed under
the terms of the Creative Commons Attri-
bution License, which permits use, distri-
bution and reproduction in other forums,
provided the original authors and source
are credited and subject to any copy-
right notices concerning any third-party
graphics etc.
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognition June 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 273 | 14
